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  The ration of legal services for the poor person accused of a crime has been remarkably thin in 
most of the United States.  Despite the constitutional right to counsel established over thirty-five 
years ago in Gideon v. Wainwright,1 many states have yet to provide capable lawyers to represent the 
accused, and the resources necessary to conduct investigations and present a defense.  A poor person 
may be without counsel when bail is set or denied, and during critical times for pretrial investigation.  
He or she may receive only perfunctory representation--sometimes nothing more than hurried 
conversations with a court-appointed lawyer outside the courtroom or even in open court-- before 
entering a guilty plea or going to trial.  The poor person who is wrongfully convicted may face years 
in prison, or even execution, without any legal assistance to pursue avenues of post-conviction 
review.  While in prison, he or she may endure practices and conditions which violate the 
Constitution, but have no access to a lawyer to seek remedies for those violations. 
 
In contrast, the person with adequate resources may secure a lawyer who will make a case for 
and perhaps obtain release on bail, work closely with the client in conducting an immediate and 
thorough investigation, present a vigorous defense at trial, pursue all available avenues of 
post-conviction relief, and challenge any constitutional violations that occur in prison. Attorney 
General Janet Reno recently observed that if justice is available only to those who can pay for a 
lawyer, "that's not justice, and that does not give people confidence in the justice system."2  Yet little 
is being done to remedy this denial of equal justice.  Indeed, the situation is deteriorating in many 
parts of the country. 
 
This article examines the availability and quality of legal services for poor persons accused of 
crimes at each stage of the criminal justice process--from arrest through trial, appeal, and 
post-conviction proceedings--and for those convicted of crimes, who languish in prisons and jails in 
need of access to the courts for protection of their constitutional rights.  It will discuss the 
indifference to injustice on the part of judges, lawyers, legislators, and a public that allows a country 
with over a million lawyers to leave many of those most in need of legal assistance without counsel at 
all, and too often with grossly inadequate counsel when any is provided.  Finally, it discusses the need 
for law schools and the legal profession to respond to these grave deficiencies in the system of justice 





THE LACK OF LEGAL SERVICES FOR  
THOSE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
  A small minority of jurisdictions in the United States have created and funded good public 
defender offices and assigned counsel programs which secure capable lawyers and provide training 
and supervision, adequate compensation, and investigative and expert assistance.3  As a result, some 
poor people accused of crimes are fortunate to be represented by capable lawyers, whose 
extraordinary dedication, selflessness, and persistence have provided a glimpse at the realization of 
the dream of Gideon v. Wainwright.  In addition, lawyers with public-interest programs and lawyers 
providing their services pro bono have represented inmates by challenging their convictions or 
conditions of confinement. 
 
But there are not nearly enough good, adequately funded programs and dedicated lawyers to 
represent the thousands of people caught up in a criminal justice system which sends more and more 
people to prison even as crime rates decline.4  An American Bar Association report found "long-term 
neglect and underfunding of indigent defense ha[ve] created a crisis of extraordinary proportions in 
many states throughout the country."5  As a result, many states provide poor defendants only 
perfunctory representation at trial and on appeal, and make no provision for legal assistance to the 
poor to challenge their convictions in post-conviction proceedings or to seek remedies for violations 
of constitutional rights while in prison. 
 
 
A. Disregard of the Constitutional Right to Counsel at Trial and on Appeal 
 
   The Supreme Court held in Gideon that a poor person facing felony charges  "cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."6  But in the years since, the courts have held 
that the lawyer need not be aware of the governing law,7 sober,8 or even awake.9 Even though a 
lawyer's immediate assignment and representation at the initial bail proceeding increase the likelihood 
that the accused will be judged fairly,10 most jurisdictions do not provide counsel for bail hearings,11 
thereby denying the accused an immediate consultation with counsel, possible release pending trial, 
and a prompt investigation of the facts.12  And, although the Supreme Court has held that the state 
must provide the indigent with transcripts13 and counsel for one appeal,14 a one-page brief may be 
sufficient, even in a capital case,15 and counsel need not show up for oral argument.16 
 
   The systems of "indigent defense" that have emerged in many jurisdictions make no pretense 
of complying with Gideon's mandate of supplying counsel to improve the defendant's chances of 
receiving a fair trial.  In these jurisdictions, the poor person facing loss of life or liberty may be 
assigned a lawyer who lacks the knowledge, skills, and often even the inclination to defend a case 
properly.17  Further, state and local governments are unwilling to allocate adequate resources for the 
representatives of indigent criminal defendants.  A lawyer assigned to represent an indigent defendant 
is paid far less than he or she could make doing any other type of legal work, and is denied the 
resources necessary for a full investigation and the retention of necessary expert witnesses.18  Yet it is 
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the defendant who pays with his or her life or liberty for the lawyer's ignorance of the law or failure to 
present critical evidence.19 
 
 
1. Resistance to Gideon 
 
There has long been and continues to be resistance and indifference to fulfilling the 
constitutional mandate of Gideon.  Over ten years after the Supreme Court decided Gideon, the 
Georgia District Attorney's Association responded to a bill introduced in 1976 for statewide funding 
of indigent defense by telling legislators that the bill constituted "the greatest threat to the proper 
enforcement of the criminal laws of this state ever presented."20  The vehement opposition by 
Georgia's judges and prosecutors delayed any state funding for years and has prevented to this day the 
establishment of a comprehensive indigent defense system there.21 
 
Even in the absence of such resistance, most state and local governments have been more 
concerned with keeping costs low than with providing quality defense services or with ensuring fair 
trials. When they have examined factors other than costs, many evaluate indigent defense programs 
not from the standpoint of ensuring fair trials, but with an eye to increasing administrative 
convenience in moving dockets and securing convictions.  In the pursuit of saving money, 
governments increasingly award contracts for representing indigent defendants to the lawyer who 
submits the lowest bid.22  Many states pay lawyers appointed to defend the poor such low rates that in 
some cases the attorneys make less than the minimum wage.23  Many jurisdictions have either refused 
outright to establish public defender programs, or have established programs but underfunded them, 
leaving the lawyers in those programs with staggering caseloads.24 
 
Despite the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Argensinger v. Hamlin,25 requiring counsel for 
poor people jailed for minor offenses, some jurisdictions still do not provide a lawyer for such cases.26 
 A county in Georgia, which for years did not provide legal representation for indigents facing 
misdemeanor charges, but instead gave them a form containing a waiver of rights and plea of guilty to 
sign,27 only recently agreed to advise persons of their right to counsel.28 
 
Many jurisdictions process the maximum number of cases at the lowest possible cost without 
regard to justice.  For example, the county commission in McDuffie County, Georgia, decided in 
1993 that the $46,000 a year it was spending on indigent defense was too much, even though, 
according to the chairwoman of the commission, the attorneys appointed to indigent cases were being 
paid "about half of what they would normally receive."29  The commission announced that it would 
accept bids from any member of the local bar to take indigent cases.30  The commission specified no 
qualifications and established no mechanism for judging the qualifications of those who submitted 
bids. 
 
The commission awarded the contract to Bill Wheeler, whose $25,000 bid was almost 
$20,000 lower than the other two bids, $44,000 and $42,000.31 The contract allowed Wheeler to 
maintain a private practice as well as defend the county's indigent defendants.  The savings of $21,000 
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to McDuffie County was not as beneficial for poor people charged with crimes--or for justice--as it 
was for McDuffie County's treasury.  Wheeler often meets people accused of crimes for the first time 
in open court and enters guilty pleas on their behalf after only a few minutes of whispered 
discussions.32  Court records disclose that in the first four years that he had the contract, Wheeler 
tried only three cases to a jury while entering 313 guilty pleas.33  Most remarkably, during that period, 
he filed only three motions.34 
 
In jurisdictions where judges appoint lawyers to defend cases, it is no secret that judges do not 
always appoint capable lawyers to defend the poor.  Clarence Darrow made an observation that is as 
true today as it was when he made it in 1924: "[N]o court ever interferes with a good lawyer's 
business by calling him in and compelling him to give his time" in defense of an indigent defendant.35  
Many judges prefer to appoint lawyers who try cases rapidly, instead of zealously, in order to move 
their dockets. 
 
In the last forty-five years, judges in Houston, Texas have repeatedly appointed Joe Frank 
Cannon, known for hurrying through trials like "greased lightening," to defend indigent defendants 
despite his tendency to doze off during trial.36  Ten of Cannon's clients have been sentenced to death, 
one of the largest numbers among Texas attorneys.37  While representing Calvin Burdine at a capital 
trial, Cannon "dozed and actually fell asleep" during trial, "in particular during the guilt-innocence 
phase when the State's solo prosecutor was questioning witnesses and presenting evidence."38 The 
clerk of the court testified that "defense counsel was asleep on several occasions on several days over 
the course of the proceedings."39 Cannon's file on the case contained only three pages of notes.40  A 
law professor who later represented Carl Johnson, a previous Cannon client, in post-conviction 
proceedings found that Cannon's "ineptitude . . . jumps off the printed page" and that Cannon slept 
during the proceedings.41  Nevertheless, the death sentences in both cases were upheld.  Carl Johnson 
has been executed. 
 
Judges in  Long Beach, California assigned the representation of numerous indigent 
defendants to a lawyer who tried cases in very little time, not even obtaining discovery in some of 
them.42  According to a former supervisor at the local public defender's office, judges liked the 
lawyer, Ron Slick, "because he was always ready to go to trial, even when it seemed he had 
inadequate time to prepare."43  A substantial number of his clients asked judges to appoint someone 
else to defend them, but their motions were denied.44  At one time, Slick had the distinction of having 
more of his clients sentenced to death--eight--than any other attorney in California.45 
 
A former president of the Arkansas Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, who was also 
involved in the defense of many capital cases in Arkansas, has described the plight of lawyers in that 
state.46  Lawyers there are in effect either forced to spend their own money or to perform "a sort of 
uninformed legal triage," ignoring some issues, lines of investigation, and defenses because of the lack 
of adequate compensation and resources.47 But the attorneys do not bear the greatest costs of this 
approach: "The lawyer pays some--in reputation, perhaps--but it is his client who may pay with his 




Children pay as well for the failure of the system to provide competent counsel.  The quality 
of legal representation for children facing delinquency proceedings in juvenile courts is a disgrace in 
many parts of the country.49 
 
2. The Consequences For Poor People Accused of Crimes 
 
The lack of representation at early stages and inadequate representation once a lawyer is 
assigned increase the risk of conviction of the innocent, often result in critical evidence not being 
presented to a jury or judge, and deprive the poor of the protections of the Bill of Rights. 
 
   Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens observed that the "recent development of reliable 
scientific evidentiary methods has made it possible to establish conclusively that a disturbing number 
of persons who had been sentenced to death were actually innocent."50  According to Justice Stevens, 
this "most dramatically illustrated" the consequences of the failure to provide competent legal counsel 
to the poor.51  The United States Department of Justice has also shown concern for the number of 
people convicted by juries but later exonerated by scientific evidence.52  Other observers have 
documented numerous instances of conviction of innocent people.53 
 
Courts decide many other issues in criminal cases besides guilt or innocence.  The integrity of 
the process by which those decisions are made is important if just results are to be reached.  One of 
the most important decisions courts make in cases in which the defendant is found guilty is how the 
offender is to be punished.  Punishments range from community service, to fines, to days in jail, to 
years in prison, to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, to death.  Competent legal 
representation is essential to ensure that such decisions are as well informed as humanly possible. 
 
Judges and juries often make important decisions without critical evidence because lawyers 
fail to present it.  Justice Thurgood Marshall once observed that "[t]he federal reports are filled with 
stories of counsel [in capital cases] who presented no evidence in mitigation of their clients' sentences 
because they did not know what to offer or how to offer it, or had not read the state's sentencing 
statute."54  An American Bar Association study found that "[i]n Tennessee . . . defense lawyers 
offered no evidence in mitigation in approximately one-quarter of all the death sentences affirmed by 
the Tennessee Supreme Court since the Tennessee legislature promulgated its current death penalty 
statute,"55 and observed that "[d]efense representation is not necessarily better in other death penalty 
states."56 
 
The consequences of not presenting such evidence is illustrated by the case of Horace 
Dunkins.  The Alabama jury that sentenced him to death was never told that he was mentally 
retarded.  Upon learning after the trial from newspaper reports that Dunkins was mentally retarded, 
one juror came forward and said she would not have voted for the death sentence if she had known of 
his condition.57  Nevertheless, Dunkins was executed. 
 
The consequences of a lawyer's ignorance of the law is illustrated by the case of John Eldon 
Smith, one of many people who have been executed even though they were sentenced to death in 
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violation of the Constitution.  Smith's lawyers were not aware that underrepresentation of women in 
the jury pools violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that juries be composed of a fair cross 
section of the population.58  The lawyers for Smith's codefendant, tried separately in the same county, 
were aware of the law, raised the issue, and won a new trial.59  At the new trial, a jury which fairly 
represented the community sentenced that codefendant to life imprisonment.60  The federal courts 
refused to consider the identical issue in Smith's case61 because his lawyers, unaware of the law, had 
not preserved it.62  A switch of the lawyers for the two defendants would have resulted in Smith 
having his conviction overturned and the codefendant being executed. 
 
While defendants may pay with their lives or liberty for the ineptness of the lawyers assigned 
to defend them, the lawyers are seldom sanctioned.  To the contrary, judges, perhaps resigned to the 
fact that capable lawyers will not defend cases for the small amounts paid, continue to assign the same 
lawyers to represent other indigent defendants. 
 
 
3. The Most Fundamental Right, Unenforceable 
 
The right to counsel is clearly the most fundamental constitutional right for a poor person 
charged with a crime.  An attorney is needed to protect the client's rights and marshal the evidence 
necessary for a fair and reliable determination of guilt or innocence and, if guilty, a proper sentence.  
But who enforces the right to counsel? 
 
The lawyer who submits the lowest bid for a county's indigent defense business is not 
necessarily capable of defending criminal cases.  However, the indigent defendant represented by an 
incapable lawyer may not even know that he or she has a right to something better than the lowest 
bidder, the lawyer who hurries through cases like "greased lightening," or a lawyer so 
undercompensated, so overworked, or so incompetent that adequate representation is impossible.  
Even those who recognize that their lawyers are inadequate may not complain, out of fear that the 
quality of the representation will deteriorate even further if they offend their lawyers by voicing a 
complaint, but the judge does not replace the lawyer.  There is the equally valid fear that the next 
lawyer appointed by the same judge may be even worse. 
 
The difficulty of enforcing the right to counsel is illustrated by the plight of, Gregory Wilson, 
an African-American man who faced the death penalty in Covington, Kentucky.  Wilson had no 
counsel because the state public defender program would not handle the case and the local indigent 
defense program could not find a lawyer because compensation for defense counsel in capital cases at 
that time was limited by statute to $2500.63 
 
When the head of the local indigent defense program urged the judge to order compensation 
beyond the statutory limit in order to secure a lawyer qualified for such a serious case, the judge 
refused and suggested that the indigent defense program rent a river boat and sponsor a cruise down 
the Ohio river to raise money for the defense.64  The judge eventually obtained counsel by posting a 
letter in the courthouse asking any member of the bar to take the case with the plea "PLEASE HELP. 
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 DESPERATE."65  The notice said nothing about qualifications to handle a capital case. The judge 
appointed three lawyers who responded, but one later withdrew.66 
 
Not surprisingly, this method of selecting counsel did not produce a "dream team."  The lead 
counsel, William Hagedorn, can charitably be described as well past his prime.  He did not have an 
office or support staff, but practiced out of his home, where a large flashing Budweiser beer sign was 
prominently displayed.67 He had never previously handled a death penalty case.68  The other lawyer 
who responded to the judge's plea for help had never before handled a felony case.69  That lawyer 
found that Hagedorn "manifested all the signs of a burned-out alcoholic. . . .  [H]e would ramble and 
digress.  At times he appeared disoriented.  He did not make sense. . . . He seemed incapable of 
having any meaningful discussion about the case."70  The attorney who administered the county's 
indigent defense system strongly objected to the appointments, saying that they were "unworkable" 
and the two lawyers could not provide "the quality of representation that is needed in this the most 
serious of all cases."71 
 
Wilson became concerned.  Almost any consumer of legal services, even one who wanted a 
lawyer only to prepare a will or an uncontested divorce, would be concerned if he or she found that 
one lawyer who was to provide those services did not have a law office and had never provided the 
services before. 
 
Wilson became even more concerned upon learning that the police had recently executed a 
search warrant and recovered stolen property in garbage bags from beneath Hagedorn's floor;72 that 
Hagedorn had engaged in unethical conduct, including forging a client's name to a check;73 and that 
Hagedorn was a "heavy drinker," who had appeared in court drunk on occasion, and was consistently 
to be found at a bar known as "Kelly's Keg."  Mr. Hagedorn had even given the name and telephone 
number of Kelly's Keg as his business address and telephone number.74  It is hard to fault Wilson for 
his concern.  Most people would be reluctant to trust even a minor legal matter to such a lawyer. 
 
But, unlike those with resources, Wilson could not afford another lawyer.  Wilson repeatedly 
objected to being represented by the lawyers appointed by the court.75  He asked the judge that he be 
provided with a lawyer who was capable of defending a capital case.76  The judge refused and 
proceeded to conduct a trial that was a travesty of justice.  Hagedorn was not even present for parts 
of the trial.77  He cross-examined only a few witnesses, including one witness whose direct testimony 
he missed because he was out of the courtroom.78  Wilson was sentenced to death. 
 
What more could Gregory Wilson have done to enforce his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel?  He objected.  He complained about the lawyers appointed by the judge, who were clearly 
incapable of defending a capital case.  He asked for a real lawyer.  Even these efforts were insufficient 
to enforce the right to counsel.  On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court attributed Hagedorn's 
performance to Wilson's supposed lack of cooperation.79 
 
In theory, the right to counsel can be protected after trial by the defendant's assertion of a 
claim of ineffective assistance.  The Catch-22 for most poor people, however, is that they need a 
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lawyer to litigate this claim in post-conviction proceedings, but the Supreme Court has held that there 
is no right to a lawyer at that stage of the process.80  Even if the state provides a lawyer to raise a 
claim of ineffectiveness, there is no guarantee that the new lawyer will be any more competent than 
trial counsel. 
 
A few states provide inmates with representation in post-conviction proceedings even though 
this practice is not constitutionally required.  Public interest programs and volunteer lawyers provide 
representation to inmates facing the death penalty in some states.  But most poor people convicted of 
crimes who are not faced with a death sentence, and even some who are, lack any access to lawyers 
to file post-conviction petitions challenging the effectiveness of the representation they received.  For 
them, there is simply no remedy for the denial of their most fundamental right. 
 
 
B. The Lack of Legal Assistance to Challenge Convictions in Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 
The rations of legal services run out altogether in many states after one appeal.  
Post-conviction proceedings -- habeas corpus review -- in the state and federal courts have 
historically provided an important means of reviewing constitutional claims.81 The Supreme Court, 
however, has held that the state is not required to provide counsel to poor people in post-conviction 
proceedings,82 and many states do not. In fact, the Supreme Court concluded in Murray v. 
Giarratano that the states are not required to provide counsel even in capital cases.83  It upheld 
Virginia's refusal to provide a lawyer for condemned defendants, saying: "Virginia may quite sensibly 
decide to concentrate the resources it devotes to providing attorneys to capital defendants at the trial 
and appellate stages of a capital proceeding.  Capable lawyering there would mean fewer colorable 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to be litigated in collateral attack."84 
 
The Court was apparently unaware that Virginia had decided not to concentrate its resources 
at either end of the criminal justice system, but instead on highways, parks, and other functions.  It 
was only in the mid-1980s that Virginia removed a limit of $600 per case for lawyers defending 
capital cases, the lowest in the nation, and placed the establishment of the fee within the discretion of 
the trial judge.85  Even after this change, the average payment to court-appointed lawyers in capital 
cases in Virginia in 1985 was only $784.56 per case.86  The Supreme Court has trusted the states to 
assure legal assistance for the poor, but many states, like Virginia, have betrayed that trust. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that inmates may have access to law libraries instead of counsel 
to prepare their own post-conviction pleadings or challenges to conditions.87  However, the Court 
gave state legislators and prison administrators "wide discretion" in fulfilling this constitutional 
mandate.88  As previously discussed, state legislators have repeatedly breached the trust the Court has 
placed in them.  Prison officials, who may be the targets of suits brought by inmates, have little 
incentive to provide access to libraries or other legal assistance. 
 
For example, Georgia's Commissioner of Corrections cut off funding in 1996 to a program at 
the University of Georgia School of Law, which employed fourteen attorneys to work with law 
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students to provide legal advice to inmates.89  The Commissioner replaced the program, which had 
provided legal services to prisoners for twenty-four years, by contracting with three recent law school 
graduates, who were friends of the head of the department of Corrections' legal office, to give legal 
advice to the state's 34,000 prisoners.90 An analysis of the legal work two and a half years later 
revealed that the lawyers hired by the Department gave "flatly erroneous advice," including advising 
inmates that a deadline for filing federal habeas corpus petitions adopted in 1996 did not apply to 
them,91 "missed viable claims," failed to investigate cases beyond reviewing the record and talking to 
trial counsel, and accepted "only the simplest and most obviously meritorious cases."92 
 
The Supreme Court added another cruel Catch-22 in Lewis v. Casey93 by requiring that in 
order to enforce the right of access to libraries or legal assistance, inmates must prove "actual injury" 
from being denied access.94  Yet without access to lawyers or libraries, inmates have no way of 
learning what their rights are and thus have virtually no chance of proving the very injury they must 
establish to gain access.95  The Supreme Court was not unaware of this dilemma.  In Lewis, it limited 
an inmate's right to bring "a grievance that the inmate wished to present,"96 but expressly disclaimed 
the notion that inmates have a right "to litigate effectively once in court."97  Of course, even if they 
had access to law libraries, most inmates lack the knowledge necessary to research the law and 
prepare pleadings under the time constraints of a one-year statute of limitations.98  Moreover, it is 
virtually impossible for an inmate to interview witnesses and litigate claims such as ineffective 
assistance of counsel from a prison cell. 
 
Inmates under sentences of death have the most desperate need for post-conviction review of 
their convictions and sentences; these inmates have often prevailed by showing that they were 
convicted or sentenced to death in violation of the Constitution.  Federal courts found constitutional 
error requiring reversal of convictions or sentences in 40% of the first 361 capital judgements 
reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings between the restoration of the death penalty in 1976 and 
mid-1991.99  Death penalty resource centers, also known as post-conviction defender organizations, 
either represented condemned inmates in post-conviction proceedings or recruited lawyers for them. 
 
The lawyers employed by the resource centers, who specialized in capital litigation, proved 
effective.  Walter McMillian, who spent six years on Alabama's death row, is free today because the 
Alabama Resource Center proved he was innocent of the murder for which he was condemned to 
die.100 Lloyd Schlup and Curtis Lee Kyles are alive today because the resource centers in Missouri 
and Louisiana established that they were sentenced to death in violation of the Constitution and were 
probably innocent of the crimes for which they were convicted.101  Congress responded to these and 
other achievements by resource center lawyers not by commending the programs for preventing 
unlawful executions and upholding the integrity of the system, but by eliminating their funding. 
 
The Attorney General of South Carolina, who ran on a promise to replace the state's electric 
chair with an electric sofa so that more people could be executed at one time, led a successful effort 
to eliminate funding for the resource centers in 1995.102 
 
The resource centers were more cost-effective than appointing individual lawyers, and the 
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specialization of the resource center attorneys provided a higher quality of representation.103  
However, those who want to speed up executions preferred a system of inadequate representation.104 
Without representation, the condemned can be swiftly dispatched to the execution chamber without 
anyone raising troubling questions of innocence or constitutional violations such as those often raised 
by the resource center attorneys. 
 
Not long after eliminating funding for the resource centers, Congress passed the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,105 which placed new, unprecedented restrictions on habeas 
corpus review, including a one-year statute of limitations.106 Thus, people who have been 
unconstitutionally convicted or sentenced now face a new, complex set of barriers to vindication of 
their constitutional rights; but those who are poor may not even have lawyers to help them understand 
the Act or comply with its provisions. 
 
Exzavious Gibson, a man with an I.Q. in the 80s, was condemned to die by Georgia.107  He 
had no lawyer in the state post-conviction proceedings and was incapable of challenging the 
effectiveness of his court-appointed lawyer on his own.108  Gibson's evidentiary hearing started as 
follows: 
 The Court: Okay. Mr. Gibson, do you want to proceed? 
 
Gibson: I don't have an attorney. 
 
The Court: I understand that. 
 
Gibson: I am not waiving my rights. 
 
The Court: I understand that.  Do you have any evidence you want to 
put up? 
 
Gibson: I don't know what to plead. 
 
The Court: Huh? 
 
Gibson: I don't know what to plead. 
 
The Court: I am not asking you to plead anything.  I am just asking 
you if you have anything you want to put up, anything you want to 
introduce to this Court. 
 
Gibson: But I don't have an attorney.109 
 
Nevertheless, the court went ahead with the hearing.  The state was represented by an 
Assistant Attorney General who specialized in capital habeas corpus cases.110  After his former 





The Court: Mr. Gibson, would you like to ask Mr. Mullis any 
questions? 
 
Gibson: I don't have any counsel. 
 
The Court: I understand that, but I am asking, can you tell me yes or 
no whether you want to ask him any questions or not? 
 
Gibson: I'm not my own counsel. 
 
The Court: I'm sorry, sir, I didn't understand you. 
 
Gibson: I'm not my own counsel. 
 
The Court: I understand, but do you want, do you, individually, want 
to ask him anything? 
 
Gibson: I don't know. 
 
The Court: Okay, sir.  Okay, thank you, Mr. Mullis, you can go 
down.111 
 
Gibson tendered no evidence, examined no witnesses, and made no objections.  The judge 
denied Gibson relief by signing an order prepared by the Attorney General's office without making a 
single change.112  The Georgia Supreme Court held that Gibson had no right to counsel and affirmed 
the denial of relief.113 
 
Some of those condemned to die in Texas could not have done any worse had they 
represented themselves than they did with the lawyers assigned to them by the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals.  The court took over appointing counsel after the Texas Resource Center, which 
had employed lawyers specializing in capital post-conviction litigation, was closed due to the 
elimination of federal funding, previously discussed.  Many of the lawyers assigned by the Court of 
Criminal Appeals have lacked experience and expertise in post-conviction litigation.  Several have 
missed deadlines for filing their applications, thereby forfeiting any post-conviction review.114  In 
refusing to consider one untimely application, the court noted that the "screamingly obvious" intent of 
the Texas legislature in setting a time limit has been "to speed up the habeas corpus process."115  
Judge Charles Baird took issue with the majority's conclusion that "speed should be our only concern 
when interpreting the statute," and argued in dissent that the court had failed "to accept our statutory 
responsibility for appointing competent counsel."116  Judge Morris Overstreet, also dissenting, said the 





Two days before the deadline expired, the lawyer assigned to represent Henry Skinner filed a 
motion with the Court of Criminal Appeals to extend the time for filing his post-conviction 
application, but the court ruled on the day the application was due that the motion for an extension 
should be filed in trial court.118  The motion was filed the following day in the trial court, which 
ultimately held it untimely.119   The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.  Judge Mansfield, concurring, 
held that the court had no authority "to clean up after counsel's errors."120  Judge Baird pointed out in 
dissent that dismissal of the application meant no court would review Skinner's claim that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel at trial by the lawyer appointed to defend him by trial judge M. 
Kent Sims: 
   Counsel [appointed to defend Skinner at trial] was the former district attorney who 
had prosecuted [Skinner] on at least two prior occasions. . . . 
 
  Moreover, when trial counsel [who represented Skinner at his capital trial] served as 
district attorney, it was well known he had a cocaine problem. Newspaper reports 
indicated trial counsel, on his way to a fund raiser for Judge Sims, was involved in an 
accident and later admitted to the hospital for a drug overdose.  Because of trial 
counsel's known drug addiction, there was a substantial investigation by the Attorney 
General's Office regarding missing funds from the district attorney's office. After 
leaving office, trial counsel was assessed a $90,000 bill from the I.R.S.  A few months 
later, trial counsel was appointed to the instant case and ultimately paid almost 
$90,000.  These facts demand a substantive evidentiary hearing before an impartial 
tribunal.121 
 
But by strictly enforcing the deadline against Skinner to prevent review of his habeas corpus 
action, the court swept any questions regarding Skinner's representation at trial under the rug.  The 
court also denied petitions in several other cases even though the incompetence of the attorney to 
handle such a case was apparent. 
 
The petition filed by a lawyer appointed by the Court of Criminal Appeals for Johnny Joe 
Martinez was described by one member of the court as follows: 
 
    The instant application is five and one half pages long and raises four challenges to 
the conviction.  The trial record is never quoted.  Only three cases are cited in the 
entire application, and no cases are cited for the remaining two claims for relief.  
Those claims comprise only 17 lines with three inches of margin.122 
 
The court's records indicated that the lawyer assigned to Martinez spent less than fifty hours 
preparing the application and did not seek any reimbursement for travel or investigatory expenses or 
seek funds for expert assistance.123  The court denied the petition over a dissent by Judge Baird which 
urged the court to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether Martinez was adequately 
represented.124  The court summarily denied what it treated as an "[a]pplication for writ of habeas 
corpus" filed by the lawyer it assigned to represent Bryan Wolfe,125 even though the pleading filed 
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"appear[ed] to be a motion for discovery."126  Again, Judge Baird, in dissent, urged his colleagues to 
remand the case for a determination of whether the inmate was properly represented.127 
 
The court assigned to Ricky Eugene Kerr an attorney who had been in practice for only two 
years, had never tried or appealed a capital case even as assistant counsel, and had suffered severe 
health problems that kept him out of his office in the months before he was to file a habeas corpus 
application on behalf of Kerr.128  The lawyer so misunderstood habeas corpus law that, as he later 
admitted, he thought he was precluded from challenging Kerr's conviction and sentence--the very 
purpose of a post-conviction petition.129  As a result, the lawyer filed a "perfunctory application" that 
failed to raise any issue attacking the conviction.130  After he and his family were unable to contact the 
lawyer, Kerr wrote a letter to the court complaining about the lawyer and asking the court to appoint 
another lawyer to prepare a habeas petition.131  Even though prosecutors did not object to a stay,132 
the Court of Criminal Appeals denied Kerr's motions for a stay of execution and for the appointment 
of competent counsel.133 Judge Overstreet, warning that the court would have "blood on its hands" if 
Kerr was executed, dissented in order to "wash [his] hands of such repugnance,"134 saying: 
 
    For this Court to approve of such and refuse to stay this scheduled execution is a 
farce and travesty of applicant's legal right to apply for habeas relief.  It appears that 
the Court, in approving such a charade, is punishing the applicant, rewarding the 
State, and perhaps even encouraging other attorneys to file perfunctory 
"non-applications."  Such a "non-application" certainly makes it easier on 
everyone--no need for the attorney, the State, or this Court to consider any potential 
challenges to anything that happened at trial.135 
 
Even the prosecutors who sought Kerr's execution acknowledged that the lawyer assigned to 
him "failed to comply with the letter and the spirit" of Texas's law allowing for post-conviction 
review.136  The Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association noted that the court in Kerr had 
demonstrated its belief "that the duty of defense counsel . . . is discharged by doing absolutely 
nothing."137 
 
Andrew Cantu finally resorted to representing himself after three different lawyers, appointed 
by the Criminal Court of Appeals to represent him over a period of eighteen months, failed even to 
file a petition.138  The first two lawyers withdrew,139 and the third never came to see him.  At the 
hearing held five months after the third lawyer was appointed, that lawyer testified that he had not 
visited Cantu, claiming that he did not know where Cantu was housed in the prison system, had not 
contacted any investigator or expert witnesses, was not familiar with and had not read the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which contains a one-year statute of limitations for 
filing a federal habeas petition,140 and was not aware of any ramifications of the Act for Cantu.141  
Cantu had no state post-conviction review of his case and was barred from federal review of his case 
because the statute of limitations expired before any petition was filed.142  Cantu was executed on 
February 16, 1999.143 
 
The Texas court has created the appearance of providing some process by appointing counsel, 
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but in fact the poor quality of lawyers it assigns actually hides constitutional error instead of 
uncovering it.144 
 
The Court of Criminal Appeals has discouraged lawyers from taking cases and devoting the 
time necessary to do an adequate job by limiting compensation of the lawyers appointed and denying 
necessary expert and investigative assistance.  Although a state bar committee found handling a 
capital post-conviction case requires between 400 and 900 hours of attorney time, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals adopted a limit on fees that compensated counsel for only 150 hours.145  The Texas 
Association of Criminal Defense warned lawyers who might be appointed: 
 
    [T]he Court's limitations [on fees] will place you in the untenable position of having 
to choose between competently representing your client and performing about 
250-750 hours of uncompensated work or, if your practice precludes such a large 
number of pro bono hours, not being able to competently represent your client.  You 
should also be aware that the Court has been routinely cutting vouchers without 
explanation, and seemingly without regard to the necessity of the work performed.  
Some attorneys have had vouchers reduced by more than $10,000.146 
 
Nevertheless, even less money is furnished by Alabama, which provides only $600 to lawyers 
for handling a capital case in state post-conviction proceedings,147 and by Georgia, which pays 
nothing in either attorney fees or expenses,148 even in a capital case. 
 
These pitifully inadequate efforts to provide lawyers in state post-conviction proceedings in 
Texas, as in most other states, have been limited to capital cases.  Poor people sentenced to less than 
death in Texas, Georgia and many other states have no access to a lawyer for post-conviction 
proceedings.  All, however, are subject to state statutes of limitations in the states that have them, as 
well as the one-year statute adopted by Congress in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act.149  Many of those poor people, particularly the illiterate or the mentally retarded, are no more 
prepared to file and litigate a post-conviction challenge without a lawyer than a passenger can be 
expected to fly the Concorde to France without a pilot. 
 
The person with means, such as Charles Keating, will retain counsel and may, as Keating did, 
obtain relief.150  But in most states the poor have no access to a lawyer to represent them in 
post-conviction proceedings.  Thus, a wrongfully convicted person who cannot afford a lawyer, even 
if clearly entitled to release, may languish in prison or be executed without ever obtaining legal 
assistance and meaningful review. 
 
 
C. Inmates Without Lawyers; Courts Stripped of Power 
 
Once imprisoned, the poor may be subject to physical and sexual assaults,151 denied competent 
medical or mental health care,152 denied an adequate diet, denied exercise, or subjected to other 
conditions and practices that violate their constitutional rights.153  But most inmates have no access to 
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lawyers, which means they have no access to the courts.  Congress has prohibited legal-services 
programs from representing prisoners154 and limited the attorney fees recoverable in a successful 
prison suit to discourage lawyers in private practice from taking those cases.155  In addition, in the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, Congress stripped the federal courts of much of their power to remedy 
unconstitutional conditions or practices in prisons and jails.156  Among other things, the Act limits the 
duration of any prospective relief to two years, permits only relief that is "narrowly drawn, extends no 
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means 
necessary to correct the violation."157  The statute also encourages the termination of existing decrees 
governing conditions and practices in prisons.158  Even before Congress acted, the Supreme Court 
had made it very difficult for inmates to challenge cruel and inhumane conditions.159  As a result, all 
sorts of abuses and degradation have been found not to violate the Constitution.160 
 
In stripping the 1.7 million men, women, and children in American prisons of lawyers, access 
to the courts, and the protections of the Constitution, Congress disregarded the important role that 
federal courts have played in making the nation's prisons less of a disgrace than they had been 
previously.  For instance, federal court orders ended some of the most cruel and inhumane practices 
and conditions that had long been common in the "dark and evil world" of Arkansas's prisons,161 such 
as lashing prisoners for minor infractions with a wooden-handled leather strap five-feet long until their 
skin was bloody,162 giving prisoners electrical shocks to sensitive parts of their body from a 
hand-cranked device known as the "Tucker telephone,"163 and crowding prisoners into barracks 
where "[h]omosexual rape was so common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not 
sleep; instead they would leave their beds and spend the night clinging to the bars nearest the guards' 
station."164 
 
Officials at Parchman Farm, the Mississippi State Penitentiary, used a three- foot leather strap, 
known as "Black Annie," to continue the practice from the era of slavery of whipping inmates,165 and 
allowed murders, rapes, beatings, and torture of inmates.166  Prisoners filed a suit in 1971 before 
federal Judge William C. Keady challenging conditions and practices at the prison.  It is unfortunate 
that members of Congress did not accompany Judge Keady on his visits to Parchman: 
 
    Keady visited Parchman on four occasions, once taking his minister.  Wandering 
through the cages, talking privately to the inmates, he discovered an institution in 
shambles, marked by violence and neglect.  The camps were laced with open ditches, 
holding raw sewage and medical waste.  Rats scurried along the floors. . . .  At one 
camp, Keady found "three wash basins for 80 men which consist of oil drums cut in 
half."  At all camps, he saw filthy bathrooms, rotting mattresses, polluted water 
supplies, and kitchens overrun with insects, rodents, and the stench of decay. 
 
   The convicts told him stories that supported [the claims made in the suit].  
Parchman was a dangerous, deadly place.  Shootings and beatings were common; 
murders went unreported; the maximum security unit was a torture chamber. Trusties 
brutalized inmates, who, in turn, brutalized each other.  "One part of me had always 





Judge Keady required prison officials to protect inmates from physical assaults by other 
inmates, to stop housing them in barracks unfit for human habitation, to end racial discrimination 
against inmates, to provide medical care, and to end other barbaric and patently unconstitutional 
practices.168 
 
Another federal judge, Frank Johnson, brought an end to the "horrendous" overcrowding in 
Alabama's prisons, where mentally disturbed inmates were "dispersed throughout the prison 
population without receiving treatment" and robbery, rape, extortion, theft, and assault were 
"everyday occurrences" among the general inmate population.169  Yet another federal judge, Judge 
William Wayne Justice, brought an end to gross overcrowding, denial of medical care, and other 
unconstitutional practices in the huge Texas prison system.170 
Abuses were not limited to Southern prisons.  A federal judge found that inmates at the 
California State Prison at San Quentin were "regarded and treated as caged animals, not human 
beings."171  Inmates at prison in Pendleton, Indiana, were shackled spread-eagle to metal bed frames 
for up to two and a half days at a time and "frequently denied the right to use the toilet and had to lie 
in their own filth" until a federal court prohibited such treatment.172 Federal court orders ended 
barbaric and shameful conditions and brutality in many other prisons as well.173 
 
Unfortunately, federal court orders have not ended all abuses in correctional institutions.  For 
example, Gail R. Williams, upon becoming director of mental health services for Alabama's prisons, 
greatly reduced the number of inmates who received psychotropic medications and discontinued the 
policy of sending the most severely mentally ill inmates to the state's secure medical facility.174  
Williams was restricted to practicing in Alabama's prisons because he had lost medical licenses in 
Michigan for engaging in sexual relations with a patient and in Oklahoma for sexually battering and 
harassing a nurse and other female staff members.175  Billy Roberts, a psychotic inmate, committed 
suicide after his anti-psychotic medication was discontinued.176  Calvin Moore died in Alabama's Kilby 
Prison at age 19 after serving seven weeks of a two-year sentence for burglary.  Although he 
displayed "severe psychiatric symptoms," lost "about a third of his body weight," and spent the last 
several days of his life "lying in his own urine, most of the time in a catatonic state," no one took his 
vital signs until a few hours before his death, and he received no medical treatment other than one 
injection of haloperidol.177  A forensic pathologist with Physicians for Human Rights found Moore's 
death to be a case of negligent homicide.178  The medical director responsible for Moore's case, 
Walter F. Mauney, became a prison doctor after being convicted of a "crime against nature" in 
Tennessee for "having oral sex with and 'sexually penetrating' a 16-year-old 'mentally defective' 
boy."179 
 
The political "war on crime" and the competition among politicians to show who can be 
toughest on crime180 have encouraged a return to neglect and mistreatment of prisoners and primitive 
practices, such as the chain gang181 and chaining inmates to metal posts.182  In this political climate, 





Georgia is among the states taking the lead in going back to a more primitive era.  After 
barely winning reelection, Governor Zell Miller appointed a political crony, Wayne Garner, an 
undertaker with no experience in corrections, as the commissioner of the state's Department of 
Corrections.183 Garner's only apparent qualification was his willingness to make provocative and 
irresponsible statements to show that he and the governor were tough on crime.  His tenure 
demonstrates the importance of access to legal representation and constitutional protections for 
inmates. 
 
Upon being appointed, Garner announced that "one-third of state prison inmates ain't fit to 
kill."184  He then took a number of highly-publicized actions to make prison life in Georgia as harsh 
and degrading as possible.  He fired the system's academic and vocational teachers two weeks before 
Christmas in 1996.185  He had previously fired seventy-nine recreation directors and seventy-four 
counselors.186  He changed the name of all but one of the department's facilities from "correctional 
institution" to "state prison."187  He eliminated hot lunches for prisoners and placed inmates in 
ninety-day boot camp programs on a diet of sandwiches and water three times a day.188  He 
announced he would require inmates to walk four miles a day.189  The Atlanta Constitution 
pronounced Garner's actions a death sentence for rehabilitation and predicted that "[i]n the next few 
years, Georgia will have to hire a new head of the state Corrections Department to undo the damage 
caused by Wayne Garner."190 
 
But Garner went considerably beyond the mean-spirited political grandstanding that has 
become common today.  After notifying the press, Garner, outfitted in the black uniform of the 
department's tactical squad, led raids on the prisons to "shakedown" cells in purported searches for 
drugs and contraband.  In a number of those raids, unresisting inmates were beaten and degraded.191  
A lieutenant who headed one of the squads participating in one of the raids described the brutal 
assault on inmates as a "dad-gum shark frenzy."192  Another correctional officer described seeing an 
unresisting inmate's face shoved into a wall: "[b]lood went up the wall.  Blood went all over the 
ground, all over the inmate.  I heard it.  I heard a sickening cracking sound."193 
 
The injured inmates would have had no access to lawyers to bring suit about this abuse had it 
not been for the existence of our office, the Southern Center for Human Rights, in Georgia.  The 
Center receives no government money and is under no restrictions with regard to the clients it 
represents.  The Center's lawyers recovered $283,500 for prisoners abused during shakedowns led by 
Commissioner Garner.194  Department of Corrections employees testified in depositions that they 
witnessed guards engage in assaults upon unresisting inmates.195 
 
As a result, the abuse of these particular inmates was brought to national attention and the 
inmates were compensated.196  The abuse would never have come to light, however, were it not for 
attorney Robert Bensing and others at the Southern Center for Human Rights. 
 
Such representation in the courts and such public attention are not the norm.  No programs 
provide representation to prisoners in most states, particularly the states with the greatest need.  It is 
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impossible to know how many other unconstitutional practices and conditions in prisons and jails go 




INDIFFERENCE TO INJUSTICE 
 
The quality of the counsel provided at trial becomes all the more important given the lack of 
access to counsel for those seeking to attack their convictions in post-conviction review, the 
restrictions on habeas corpus adopted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, and the absence of constitutional protections for those in prison.  For most poor people 
accused of crimes, trial is not just the "main event;"197 it is the only event.  But, as discussed 
previously, many poor defendants stand virtually defenseless at trial, accompanied only by what Judge 
David Bazelon called "walking violations of the Sixth Amendment."198 
 
Harold Clarke, when he served as Chief Justice of Georgia, aptly described the approach not 
only of Georgia, but of many states in responding to the call of Gideon: "[W]e set our sights on the 
embarrassing target of mediocrity. I guess that means about halfway. And that raises a question. Are 
we willing to put up with halfway justice? To my way of thinking, one-half justice must mean one-half 
injustice, and one-half injustice is no justice at all."199 
 
Although the need for adequate funding for indigent defense programs is obvious, immense 
and undeniable, legislators refuse to appropriate sufficient funds.  Inadequately funded programs 
cannot obtain the services of capable lawyers and must handle so many cases that effective 
representation is difficult or impossible.  Moreover, many indigent defense programs are 
compromised in their ability to provide zealous representation because they are not independent of the 
executive or judiciary.  Courts not only tolerate indefensible representation that results from 
underfunded systems, but contribute to it by appointing lawyers who are not capable of handling the 
cases assigned and denying the resources needed to present a defense.  In addition, the Supreme 
Court, instead of enforcing Gideon, has been a major culprit in this denial of equal justice.  It adopted 




A. Inadequate Funding 
 
The most fundamental reason for the poor quality or absence of legal services for the poor in 
the criminal justice system is the refusal of governments to allocate sufficient funds for indigent 
defense programs. 
 
Legislatures in many states have failed adequately to fund public defender programs, leaving 
public defenders with overwhelming caseloads and the immense pressure of being responsible for the 
lives and liberty of too many fellow human beings.201  While public defender offices attract some of 
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the most dedicated and conscientious young lawyers, those lawyers find it exhausting and enormously 
difficult to provide adequate representation when saddled with huge caseloads and lacking the 
necessary investigative assistance. 
 
A public defender in New Orleans represented 418 defendants during the first seven months of 
1991.202  During this time, he entered 130 guilty pleas at arraignment and had at least one serious case 
set for trial on every single trial date during the period.203  In "routine cases," he received no 
investigative support because the three investigators in the public defender's office were responsible 
for more than 7000 cases per year.204 Additionally, no funds were available for expert witnesses.205 
 
Even though funding for indigent defense programs has long been recognized as inadequate, 
some jurisdictions have reduced funding.  In Pittsburgh, for example, the county commission slashed 
funds and job positions at the public defender office in 1996,206 leaving the office with forty-five 
lawyers, twelve less than the fifty-seven who were there previously.207  Eight full-time investigators 
were also fired.208  The attorneys were paid between $24,000 and $32,000 and are permitted to have 
part-time legal practice on the side.209  An independent study the year before had concluded that the 
public defender's office was in crisis because of chronic under-funding and "years of neglect."210  
Judge David S. Cercone, head of the court's Criminal Division, had expressed similar concern, saying 
that, "[w]e do not think there is any fat to be cut from the public defender's office."211  The county 
commissioners responded to the study by cutting $1 million from the $3.9 million budget.212  
Nonetheless, the commissioners somehow found a way to move two of their supporters into positions 
that paid $50,000 each, which is double the starting salary of a new public defender.213 
 
In Wisconsin, Governor Tommy Thompson proposed cuts to the state public defender's 
budget,214 more flat rate payments to appointed counsel,215 increases in public defender caseloads,216 
and limits on how much public defenders and appointed attorneys can spend on court documents and 
investigative services.217  When the 1995-97 budget ultimately was passed, $3.85 million was cut 
from the allocation for indigent defense.218 
 
Many jurisdictions have no public defender programs.  Cases are assigned to individual 
lawyers or lawyers who have contracted to handle the cases of indigent defendants.219  Many states 
and localities compensate lawyers so poorly that it is impossible to attract capable lawyers and 
impossible for the lawyers to survive in practice if they devote the time required to defend cases 
properly. 
 
In Virginia, for example, attorneys for indigent defendants are limited to  $100 for defending 
someone in a misdemeanor case in district court, $132 for defending a misdemeanor case in circuit 
court, $305 for defending a felony case where the punishment is less than 20 years, and $845 where 
the punishment is more than 20 years.220  When one attorney challenged the limit in felony cases, 
arguing that once the attorney exceeds the limit and is forced to work uncompensated, it creates a 
conflict between the lawyer's pecuniary interests and zealous representation of the client, the circuit 
judge removed him from the case.221  One circuit judge announced at calendar call that any attorney 
raising the conflict of interest issue would be removed from the list of appointed counsel.222  As each 
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case was called, the judge asked the attorney whether he or she intended to raise the issue.223 
 
In Alabama, lawyers representing indigent defendants are paid $20 an hour for out-of-court 
preparation up to a limit of $1,000 to defend a non-capital case; for a capital case, the fees are limited 
to $1,000 for the out- of-court work plus an additional $20 an hour for all in-court work.224 In some 
rural areas in Texas, lawyers receive no more than $800 to handle a capital case.225  Generally, the 
hourly rate is $50 or less.226  In Mississippi, lawyers are paid $1,000 dollars and reimbursed for their 
overhead expenses for defending a capital case.227  In Louisiana, some indigent defense counsel are 
not paid at all.228 
 
The result is that these lawyers often earn less than the minimum wage for defending someone 
in a serious felony case or even a capital case.  For example, an Alabama lawyer who spends 500 
hours preparing for a death penalty trial will be paid $4 an hour.  Imagine what kind of legal 
representation a poor person accused of a capital crime gets for $4 an hour.  Unfortunately, the old 
adage, "you get what you pay for," applies with special force in the law. Most good lawyers do not 
work for $4 an hour or even $20, $50 or $100 an hour. Lawyers paid so little cannot afford to spend 
the time required to conduct interviews, investigations and negotiations, and defend cases at trials.  
As one Virginia prosecutor observed: 
 
    What it boils down to is, you get what you pay for.  Look who's on a court- 
appointed list anywhere.  Very few experienced attorneys are on those lists, and the 
reason is, they can't afford to be on them. 
 
      So you either have very inexperienced attorneys right out of law school for whom 
 any money is better than no money.  Or you have people who are really bad lawyers 
who can't make a living except off the court appointed list.229 
 
The prosecutor said that such a system "doesn't give me any satisfaction as a prosecutor, and I 
don't think it serves justice."230 
 
In addition, lawyers appointed to defend indigent defendants are often not paid for months or 
years after they provide the representation.231  Often, their applications for compensation are 
arbitrarily reduced by judges and bureaucrats.232  This discourages lawyers from taking the cases of 
indigent defendants. 
 
Frequently, lawyers are denied the investigative and expert assistance essential to providing 
adequate representation.  Here, again, the courts have constructed yet another Catch-22 by requiring 
the lawyer to demonstrate an extensive need for expert or investigative assistance, a showing that 
frequently cannot be made without the very expert assistance that is sought.233 
 
The burdens on already overtaxed and inadequate indigent defense systems are growing.  With 
the passage of each new crime bill, Congress and state legislatures create scores of new crimes, 
increase penalties for existing crimes, and appropriate millions of dollars to law enforcement and 
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prosecution.234  These measures increase the number of arrests and prosecutions and the severity of 
the sentences that may be imposed.  Despite the fact that the legislation creates a greater need for 




B. The Lack of Independence of Indigent Defense Programs 
 
Many indigent defense programs are not independent of the people trying to imprison or 
execute the clients served by those programs.  In some states, governors who sign death warrants also 
appoint the state defenders who are to defend the very people the governor has ordered killed.  
Legislatures have reduced or eliminated funding of programs that have been effective in the past or 
have restructured them.  Judges control the appointment and compensation of defense counsel in 
many states and often assign cases to lawyers clearly incapable of providing competent representation. 
 The lack of independence in many cases has a substantial adverse impact on the quality of legal 
services provided.  Indeed, when judges and executives control programs which continually provide 
deficient representation to the accused, it can fairly be said that lawyers are being provided to the 
poor only to create an appearance of legitimacy to a system that lacks fairness. 
Politicians who compete with one another to show who is the toughest on crime235 often 
control funding and even the appointment of personnel for indigent defense programs.  For example, 
Paul Patton, upon becoming the new governor of Kentucky, signed five execution warrants his 
second day in office to show that he was tough on crime.236  The Public Advocate, Allison Connelly, 
noted the inappropriateness of signing the warrants because the cases of all five of the condemned 
were pending before courts.237  Lawyers from her office secured stays of execution. 
 
But the same governor who signed the death warrants appoints the public defender.238  When 
the time came to renew Connelly's appointment, Patton refused to reappoint her,239 even though the 
Public Advocacy Commission had unanimously recommended her reappointment and judges and 
lawyers had praised the job she had done.240 Regardless of why Patton refused to reappoint Connelly, 
there was an appearance that it may have been related to the discharge of her duties in defending 
indigent clients. 
 
In Florida, legislators attacked the Office of the Capital Collateral Representative (CCR) for 
its representation of condemned inmates in that state, saying that it needlessly delayed executions.241  
Stephen Hanlon, who oversees Holland & Knight law firm's pro bono division and has worked with 
CCR attorneys, responded that, "I am firmly convinced that the criticism CCR received was not 
because it was frivolous but because it was effective."242 
 
The legislature split CCR into three separate offices and provided that the governor, who 
signs the death warrants setting executions, would appoint the director of each new office.243  The 
legislature also provided that the Judicial Nominating Commission would now submit nominees for 
the positions to the governor, instead of the state's public defenders, who had previously 




The Judicial Nominating Commission gave the governor eight nominees: four lawyers who 
had experience in representing persons facing the death penalty and four with no such experience.  
Governor Lawton Chiles appointed only from the second group, choosing a lawyer in private practice 
and two former prosecutors,245 one of whom had worked in the governor's office for twelve years,246 
and before that, represented the state in twelve capital cases during five and a half years as an 
assistant attorney general.247  It is neither unusual nor undesirable for a lawyer with prosecution 
experience to become a defense lawyer.  A new convert, however, is usually not made Pope on the 
same day of the conversion.  These circumstances put together--the governor's role in signing death 
warrants, the enormous political benefits that Florida governors have reaped from signing death 
warrants,248 and the appointment of two prosecutors with no defense experience over nominees with 
experience in defending capital cases--would cause any objective observer to question whether the 
goal of the appointments was to frustrate zealous representation instead of ensuring it. 
 
The representation provided by the offices created raises even graver questions.  The most 
experienced attorney assigned to defend Judi Buenoano when the governor signed a warrant for her 
execution was not qualified to work in federal court.249  Experienced attorneys were fired or left the 
new agencies.250  The office in Tampa, run by a former prosecutor and unsuccessful candidate for 
State Attorney, hired lawyers with no experience in capital litigation, including one lawyer who had 
spent three years managing Hogtown Bar-B-Q restaurants.251  A circuit judge described the office as 
a "disorganized, chaotic place where, at times, interns/trainees file motions and pleadings in cases 
carrying society's most severe penalty;" the judge found the attorneys for one death row inmate 
"incompetent," and replaced them with a private lawyer.252  The office in Tallahassee could not find 
lead attorneys for half of its cases.253 
 
Ohio Attorney General Betty Montgomery attacked the state public defender's office, saying 
its death penalty attorneys were "gaming the system and making it a mockery" by maneuvering for 
delays to stop executions.254  She introduced a proposal to prohibit public defenders from receiving 
tax funds for representing condemned inmates if they win appeals alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel.255  In February 1996, following Montgomery's statement and proposal, Ohio Public Defender 
David Bodiker fired two top staff members, including a twelve-year veteran. Bodiker stated "there's 
always been widespread optimism that we could prevent executions.  I don't share that."256 
 
Bodiker claimed his actions were unrelated to the Attorney General's criticism.  The fired 
attorneys filed a complaint with the Ohio Public Defender Commission, claiming Bodiker prevents 
attorneys from zealously defending death- row clients and that he "has politicized the office to reflect 
the pro-death penalty views of" Governor George Voinovich and Attorney General Montgomery.257 
 
The problem is not limited to the state courts.  The appointment of public defenders in many 
judicial districts by federal judges "creates a serious problem of perception and provides the 
opportunity for occasional abuse," a committee of judges and lawyers appointed by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist reported.258  One example is the refusal in 1992 by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit to renew the appointment of highly respected federal defender Fred Bennett, after 
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eleven years in office.259  The judges apparently did not like the aggressive advocacy of Bennett and 
his assistants, but it may be fairly questioned whether this action promoted the best interests of the 
clients served by the federal defender or whether the judges disagreed with the zealous representation 
of poor people. 
 
Judges' participation in assigning the cases of indigent defendants to lawyers and in deciding 
whether to allow funds for experts and investigators improperly involves the judiciary in the 
management of the defense.  Judges not only tolerate attorney incompetence, but they very often 
continue to appoint the same lawyers to case after case.  Judges in Houston have been appointing Joe 
Frank Cannon, who tries cases like "greased lightening" and falls asleep during capital trials, to defend 
cases for 45 years.260  Their motivation was clearly not the provision of zealous representation to the 
accused. 
 
Many judges may be more interested in docket control or avoiding reversal than in ensuring an 
earnest defense for poor defendants.  Judges also use appointments as a patronage system for lawyers 
who need the business because they cannot get other legal work.  A study of homicide cases in 
Philadelphia revealed that judges there appointed attorneys to defend cases based on political 
connections, not on legal ability.261  The study disclosed that "Philadelphia's poor defendants often 
find themselves being represented by ward leaders, ward committeemen, failed politicians, the sons of 
judges and party leaders, and contributors to the judges' election campaigns."262 As might be 
expected, treating the assignment of criminal cases as part of a judicial patronage system does not 
always result in the best legal representation.  The study found that "even officials in charge of the 
system say they wouldn't want to be represented in Traffic Court by some of the people appointed to 
defend poor people accused of murder."263  There is the appearance--and in many cases the 
reality--that many of the lawyers who depend upon appointments from judges are reluctant to provide 
zealous representation for fear of alienating the judge and jeopardizing future business.264 An 
experienced criminal defense lawyer in Houston described the attitude of many lawyers there who get 
appointed to defend indigents: 
 
    The mindset of a lot of court-appointed lawyers is to please the judge, to curry 
favor with the judge by getting a quick guilty plea from the client. Then everybody's 
happy.  The judge has the case off the docket.  The prosecutor doesn't have to mess 
with it.  The defendant is off to wherever he's going.  And the lawyer has made a 
relatively decent fee: about $150 for basically an hour of his time.  That's much more 
economical for a lawyer who's earning a living off of court appointments than to reset 
the case, go out and investigate, probably not get paid for his time, have to do a bunch 
of work, and maybe aggravate the judge by keeping the case on the docket.265 
 
The appointed lawyers also stay in the good graces of the judges by contributing to their campaigns 
for office.266 
 
Once the resource center employing capital litigation specialists to represent or recruit counsel 
for the condemned in Texas post-conviction proceedings ceased to exist, the Court of Criminal 
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Appeals began assigning attorneys to represent death-sentenced inmates in post-conviction 
proceedings. The appointment of lawyers by the Court of Criminal Appeals can only be described as a 
disaster.  The court's lack of concern about the quality of representation to be provided was apparent 
from the outset when the court, in suddenly conscripting forty-eight attorneys to handle capital 
post-conviction cases, appointed a longtime federal prosecutor to represent one of the condemned.267 
 The court was not even aware that the prosecutor was still employed with the U.S. Attorney's office 
and was on special assignment to the Justice Department and thus could not represent a 
death-sentenced inmate. The court later appointed two of its former law clerks to fourteen capital 
post-conviction cases and paid them $265,000.268  The two former clerks had no experience as 
attorneys in representing such defendants.269  But, it would be impossible for even the most 
experienced lawyers to take on so many cases and provide adequate representation in all of them. 
 
The court appointed lawyers who missed deadlines and filed petitions that did not raise a 
single issue,270 and so limited compensation that lawyers assigned cases are required to choose 
between working hundreds of hours without compensation or not providing competent 
representation.271  Moreover, the court has been unwilling to allow untimely petitions to be filed or to 
assign competent lawyers even when it was apparent beyond peradventure that the lawyer handling 
the case was totally inept.272  The Texas Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys passed a 
resolution finding that the Court of Criminal Appeals had "made it clear . . . that it will not afford a 
citizen sentenced to death any meaningful review, and further that it will often refuse to pay necessary 
investigative and other expenses, forcing the appointed counsel, in effect, to finance the proceedings 
themselves."273  The actions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals can fairly be said to go beyond 
indifference to injustice, to outright hostility to justice.274 
 
Indigent defense programs' lack of independence is a serious, but seldom discussed, problem 
that compromises their ability to provide zealous representation of clients.  As observed by Justice 
Blackmun: 
 
    The county's control over the size of and funding for the public defender's office, as 
well as over the number of potential clients, effectively dictates the size of an 
individual attorney's caseload and influences substantially the amount of time the 
attorney is able to devote to each case. The public defender's discretion in handling 
individual cases and therefore his ability to provide effective assistance to clients is 
circumscribed to an extent not experienced by privately retained attorneys.275 
 
A state's chief law enforcement officer who has responsibility for obtaining convictions should 
not be appointing the person responsible for the defense.  Management of the defense is not a proper 
judicial function.  Judges should be fair and impartial, and independent of both prosecution and 
defense. Instead, independent boards should operate indigent defense programs.  Those programs 
should assign lawyers to cases based upon the lawyer's ability to provide effective representation, not 
speed, administrative convenience, political connections or other factors unrelated to the lawyer's 





C. A Standard of Effective Assistance That Denies Equal Justice 
 
The Supreme Court correctly observed in 1942 that "[t]he right to have the assistance of 
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the 
amount of prejudice resulting from its denial."276  In 1984, however, the Court decided that prejudice 
to a defendant could be based on a rough calculation of whether counsel's deficient performance 
affected the outcome.  In Strickland v. Washington,277 the Court not only adopted this standard of 
prejudice; it went one step further in putting the burden of proof on the defendant to make the 
showing.278 The Court also required that, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a 
defendant must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance,"279 and show that the attorney's representation "fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness."280  This standard has proven to be so malleable that the mere 
presence of a lawyer at counsel table is often found to be sufficient representation.281 
 
Judge Alvin Rubin of the Fifth Circuit put it bluntly: 
 
    The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require that the accused, 
even in a capital case, be represented by able or effective counsel. . . .  Consequently, 
accused persons who are represented by "not-legally-ineffective" lawyers may be 
condemned to die when the same accused, if represented by effective counsel, would 
receive at least the clemency of a life sentence.282 
There is ample support for this frank admission that, under the standard established in 
Strickland, the courts do not deliver on the promise of equal justice for rich and poor.283  Stark 
examples of just how bad a lawyer can be and still be found effective under Strickland are provided 
by three Texas capital cases in which defense lawyers slept during trial.  The Houston Chronicle 
described the following spectacle in one of the cases: 
 
    Seated beside his client  –  a convicted capital murderer –  defense attorney John 
Benn spent much of Thursday afternoon's trial in apparent deep sleep. 
 
  His mouth kept falling open and his head lolled back on his shoulders, and then he 
awakened just long enough to catch himself and sit upright.  Then it happened again.  
And again.  And again. 
 
  Every time he opened his eyes, a different prosecution witness was on the stand 
describing another aspect of the Nov. 19, 1991, arrest of George McFarland in the 
robbery-killing of grocer Kenneth Kwan. 
 
  When state District Judge Doug Shaver finally called a recess, Benn was asked if he 
truly had fallen asleep during a capital murder trial. 
 




  Court observers said Benn seems to have slept his way through virtually the entire 
trial.284 
 
Attorney Benn's sleeping did not offend the Sixth Amendment, the trial judge explained, 
because, "[t]he Constitution doesn't say the lawyer has to be awake."285  The Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals apparently agreed.  It rejected McFarland's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,286 
applying the standard established in Strickland; the dissent, however, argued that "[a] sleeping 
counsel is unprepared to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present any 
coordinated effort to evaluate evidence and present a defense."287 
 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also found that a sleeping attorney was sufficient 
"counsel" under Strickland in the case of Calvin Burdine.288  And both the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held Carl Johnson did not satisfy 
Strickland even though his attorney slept during parts of the trial.289  Neither court published its 
opinion.290  Carl Johnson was executed on September 19, 1995. 
 
Wallace Fugate was sentenced to death after a two-day trial in Georgia, in which he was 
represented by a lawyer who had never heard of Gregg v. Georgia,291 the case that upheld the current 
death penalty law in Georgia, Furman v. Georgia,292 the decision that declared the death penalty 
unconstitutional in 1972, or any other relevant case.293 Not surprisingly given his complete ignorance 
of the law, the lawyer did not make a single objection during the entire two-day capital trial.294 
 
Being defended by such a lawyer is much like being treated by a doctor who has never heard 
of penicillin.  Such a doctor likely never heard of tetracycline or of heart bypass surgery, either.  If a 
doctor failed to treat a patient properly due to such a gross lack of knowledge, courts would not 
hesitate to find malpractice.  But under Strickland, such ignorance on the part of a lawyer does not 
violate the Sixth Amendment.  The following question was presented to the Georgia Supreme Court 
in seeking review of the representation provided to Wallace Fugate: 
 
    Whether the standard of "counsel" is now so low in capital trials in this state that it 
is satisfied by the mere presence of individuals with bar cards at counsel table with the 
accused, who act primarily as spectators and are completely ignorant of the law--even 
to the point of being unaware of the Supreme Court's opinion in the seminal capital 
case of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), make no objections, give closing 
arguments which contradict each other, and fail completely to make the trial an 
adversarial testing process?295 
 
The court denied a certificate of probable cause even to review the case.296 
 
The Supreme Court has adopted strict procedural default doctrines that bar review of any 
issue not properly raised and preserved by counsel.297 Strickland, however, allows defendants to be 
represented by lawyers who are ignorant of the law, who do no investigation, and who are thus 
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completely incapable of complying with the strict procedural requirements the Court has adopted.  As 
a result, states have no incentive to provide adequate representation to poor people.  By assigning the 
indigent accused inadequate counsel, the state increases its chances of obtaining a conviction and 
reduces the scope of appellate and post-conviction review.  So long as the lawyer's performance 
meets the Strickland standard, those cases in which the accused received the poorest legal 
representation will receive the least scrutiny on appeal and in postconviction review because of the 
lawyer's failure to preserve issues,298 assert the right legal grounds for objections,299 and put on 
evidence to provide a factual basis for relief.300 
 
The Supreme Court stated as one basis for requiring the defendant to prove prejudice, "[t]he 
government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors."301  That is simply 
not true in cases involving poor people who have court-appointed lawyers.  A poor person accused of 
a crime does not choose an attorney; a judge or some other government official assigns a lawyer to 
represent the defendant. Thus, the government is responsible for deficient representation when it 
provides a lawyer who lacks the experience and skill to handle the case, or when it denies the lawyer 
the resources necessary to investigate the case and present a defense.  Strickland allows the 
government to get away with it. 
 
III 
THE CHALLENGE TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE LAW SCHOOLS 
 
What has been the response of the legal profession, of the silk stocking lawyers with six- or 
seven-figure incomes at the prosperous law firms, to the sleeping lawyers in Houston, the defiance of 
Gideon, the defiance of Argensinger, and the denial of access to courts for those most in need?  A 
small percentage have been concerned about these shocking injustices.  But most lawyers simply ask, 
"Did we have a good year?  What's my draw?"  The plight of the poor is out of sight and out of mind. 
 
Bar associations once provided leadership in urging the creation and funding of indigent 
defense programs, but many appear to have conceded defeat after writing numerous unheeded reports 
on the sad state of indigent defense.  Bar associations and individual lawyers, however, must renew 
their efforts to build good indigent defense programs in one community after another.  Lawyers have 
a monopoly on the practice of law.  They are trustees of justice.  They have a responsibility to see that 
justice is available not only to the wealthy, but to all.  We do not have equal justice in this country and 
are not even near achieving it.  In many parts of the country, the situation, already inadequate, is 
deteriorating. 
 
New and more aggressive efforts are needed.  Rick Teissier, a public defender in New 
Orleans, challenged the excessive caseloads and lack of investigative assistance in his office.  The 
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the clients were "not provided with the effective assistance of 
counsel the constitution requires," required pretrial hearings on whether lawyers could effectively 
handle cases, and prohibited prosecutions from going forward in cases where effective assistance 
could not be provided due to a lawyer's workload and lack of resources.302  A lawsuit challenging 
inadequacies in Connecticut's public defender system has been filed.303  Other similar suits should be 
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filed as well. 
 
But the legal profession should do more.  State and local bar associations could establish and 
fund model indigent defense programs.  The Georgia bar recently announced that it would assess each 
of its members fifty dollars a year over several years so that the bar could buy a building.304  This is a 
classic example of the misplaced priorities of bar associations.  The bar association should assess its 
members to fund adequate, independent indigent defense programs before it makes assessments to 
buy a building. 
 
Regardless of the success of bar associations in bringing about systemic changes and increased 
funding, more lawyers must put the quest for justice before the pursuit of money and come forward to 
represent those who cannot afford a lawyer.  They must join those already litigating the rights to 
adequate compensation, to the funds necessary to investigate, and to the experts needed to prepare 
and present a proper defense. 
 
Law schools and law students must respond to the lack of legal services for those accused of 
crimes or in prison because the courts and legislatures have been indifferent for so long.  Because so 
many states will not establish public defender systems to recruit, train and supervise law graduates, 
the law schools must send their graduates out with the skills necessary to represent criminal 
defendants in places where there is the greatest need.  For the most part, law schools are not currently 
doing this. 
 
Many law schools put little emphasis on criminal law.  They are turning out graduates who are 
only fit to be associates at law firms, not lawyers capable of defending poor people accused of crimes. 
 Placement offices at many schools encourage students to pursue the money and prestige of the law 
firms, and do not even make students aware of the public defender programs that desperately need 
young, dedicated and talented lawyers. 
 
Some law schools prefer to hire professors who have never practiced law.  While many of 
these professors are brilliant scholars who make immeasurable contributions to the law, some publish 
virtually incomprehensible articles that have little relation to reality.  Law schools should also have a 
place on their faculties for lawyers with practical experience in the trenches.  A professor who has 
never been in the courtroom can no more prepare a student to be a trial lawyer than a person who has 
never changed a tire can teach someone to be a mechanic. 
 
More law schools should follow the example of New York University, which has outstanding 
clinical programs educating students and serving the poor in many areas.  New York University 
students have been involved in efforts to ensure adequate representation to those facing the death 
penalty in Alabama and in New York.  Another model is Harvard Law School's Criminal Justice 
Institute, which provides an outstanding educational experience for students, gives quality 
representation to poor people in the local courts, and sends Harvard graduates into public defender 
offices.  Northeastern University Law School also provides an outstanding example with a 
cooperative program that places students in public interest programs all over the country, where they 
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make immense contributions while learning how to represent those most in need.  More law schools 
should create graduate programs like the E. Barrett Prettyman Fellowships at the criminal justice and 
juvenile justice clinics at the Georgetown University Law Center. 
 
These programs not only teach students how to defend people accused of crimes, but they 
also educate students about the desperate need for legal services of those whose lives or liberty is at 
stake in the legal system.  They teach students that those accused of crimes are neither "animals" nor 
"subhuman," but human beings who are more than the worst thing they did in their lives. Too many 
law school graduates are simply unaware of the lack of legal services for those facing criminal charges 
or in prison.  With awareness, the many graduates who become leaders can, as Robert Kennedy did 





Although the Supreme Court stated in Gideon v. Wainwright that lawyers are  "necessities, 
not luxuries,"305 the reality in the United States today is that representation by a capable attorney is a 
luxury, one few of those accused of a crime or in prison can afford.  There is a temptation to give up 
hope that the poor person who faces the loss of life or liberty or languishes in prison will ever receive 
adequate representation.  Legislatures will not pay for it, most courts will not order it, and most 
members of the bar are unwilling or financially unable to represent a poor person in a criminal case 
without adequate compensation. 
 
There has never been equal justice in the courts of the United States, state or federal, but 
equal justice has been the most fundamental aspiration of our legal system.  It represents the kind of 
legal system we would like to have and the kind of society we aspire to be.  It has been an important 
goal that has challenged the legal system, the bar and society.  Those responsible, however, appear to 
have given up on the quest for equal justice for rich and poor. Many, including members of the 
Supreme Court,306 appear ready to sandblast the words "Equal Justice Under Law" off the front of 
the Supreme Court building and acknowledge that our courts and our system of justice, like our 
country clubs, are open and available only for those who can afford them. But this simply 
demonstrates that the challenge is as immense as it is important.  Bar associations, law schools, 
individuals, and law students must lead new efforts for adequate funding, structure and independence 
for indigent defense programs.  Lawyers should not be silent about the failure to provide equal justice; 
they must bear witness to the deficiencies of the system in the hope of prompting legislatures and 
courts to take their eyes off the embarrassing target of mediocrity and to take aim at a full measure of 
justice for all citizens. 
 
Individual lawyers can and must provide zealous representation to some poor people, even if 
the government fails in its larger responsibility of providing legal services to everyone.  As a result of 
the efforts of some dedicated lawyers, some innocent people will avoid wrongful conviction; some 
troubled youths will be diverted to drug, alcohol, mental health, job training and other programs 
instead of prisons; some who were wrongfully convicted will obtain their release; some will live 
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instead of being put to death by the government, and others will receive professional advice and 
zealous advocacy through what is to them the strange and foreign land of the criminal justice system. 
 
These efforts by individual lawyers in the quest for equal justice are not insignificant.  They 
are, of course, fundamentally important to those individuals whose lives and liberty are at stake.  They 
also demonstrate a recognition of the preciousness of life, liberty, fairness and adherence to the Bill of 
Rights in a time and a culture of misplaced values and indifference to injustice.  They set an example 
that reminds us that achieving equal justice for all is not beyond the grasp of this wealthy society.  We 
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